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COMMENT
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AS LEGAL ANALYSIS
Yoram Margaliotht
The world's GDP per capita has grown significantly since World
War II, but the distribution of wealth across countries has been ex-
tremely unequal.' As William J. Baumol first noted, two clusters
formed: one around wealth and one around poverty.2 The wealthy
countries converged.3 While a number of developing countries, most
notably China and India,4 also seem to be on the path to prosperity,
other countries, home to more than one billion people, seem doomed
to their poverty cluster.5
Economists have found that even after controlling for differences
in resources, including physical and human capital, large differences
in GDP per capita across countries remain.6 This has led them to
think that the existence of differences in the quality of institutions
across countries explains the persistent divergence in income per cap-
ita.7 Their theory's main premise is that institutions influence the
form and rate of technological progress, which is the engine of sus-
tained economic growth, and shape the incentives of economic and
political agents, which are the bread and butter of economics. Be-
cause institutions are more difficult to change than economic policies,
economists can treat them as state variables that explain the differ-
ences in growth rates across countries."
This theory has one problem: implementation. Studies of the ec-
onomic effects of institutions "remain at a very aggregate level of gen-
t Associate Professor, Tel Aviv University, Faculty of Law.
1 See, e.g., ELHANAN HELPMAN, THE MYSTERY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 7 (2004).
2 See William J. Baumol, Productivity Growth, Convergence, and Welfare: What the Long-
Run Data Show, 76 Am. EcON. REV. 1072, 1072 (1986).
3 See id.
4 See International Macroeconomic Data Set, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIc. (Jan. 19, 2011), http:/
/www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Macroeconomics/#HistoricalMacroTables.
5 See, e.g., PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE
FAILING AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 3-4 (2007).
6 Elhanan Helpman, Introduction to INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 1, 1
(Elhanan Helpman ed., 2008).
7 See DANI RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES: GLOBALIZATION, INSTITUTIONS,
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 51 (2007) ("In the long run, the main thing that ensures conver-
gence with the living standards of advanced countries is the acquisition of high-quality
institutions.").
8 Helpman, supra note 6, at 13.
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erality and do not provide much policy guidance."9 What we know is
that institutions are necessary to protect property rights to attract in-
vestments; enforce contracts to allow the existence of markets; impose
taxes to finance the provision of public goods; regulate product, la-
bor, and financial markets to curb fraud, anticompetitive behavior,
and moral hazards; provide macroeconomic stabilization to control
inflation and unemployment; create some kind of a judicial mecha-
nism to resolve conflicts; and provide social insurance to foster social
cohesion and allow individuals to take economic risks.10
All of these functions can be provided through diverse institu-
tional forms."1 Indeed, significant differences in institutional arrange-
ments exist amongst countries with sustained economic growth.
Plausibly, developing countries can gain from the experience of devel-
oped countries in building their institutions, but the design of institu-
tions should be bottom-up, relying on local knowledge of the specific
country's economy and social norms. Similarly, the introduction to a
collection of recent articles on growth economics, economic history,
and political science concludes, "As is evident from reading these
chapters, despite the great progress that has been made, the resulting
cumulative knowledge cannot yet effectively be used to design social,
political, and economic institutions that will best serve societies with
varying features. However, the way is being paved toward this goal." 12
Chantal Thomas's Law and Neoclassical Economic Development in
Theory and Practice: Toward an Institutionalist Critique of Institutionalism13
explores this goal in three parts. Part I offers an original, provocative,
intellectual history of the rise of institutional theory. 1 4 Part II criti-
cizes the application of institutional theory to practice, along the lines
mentioned above, and offers an original criticism of an influential pa-
per on causality.1 5 In part III, Thomas offers a general explanation
9 RODRIK, supra note 7, at 51.
10 For further elaboration of these claims, see JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND
PUBLIC POLICY (2d ed. 2007); GARETH D. MYLES, PUBLIC EcoNoMIcs (1995); HARVEY S. Ro-
SEN, PUBLIC FINANCE (6th ed. 2002); JOSEPH E. STIGLITz, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
(3d ed. 2000).
11 For example, private property was not legally recognized in the 1990s in China, and
even today, the court system is not independent. Nevertheless, investors' property rights
were well protected through the following mechanism: investments typically took place in
enterprises that were partly owned by local governments. By letting the Chinese govern-
ment hold residual rights in the investment, the investors benefited from the government's
expectation of future profits, which protected them against its desire to expropriate the
investment. See RODRIK, supra note 7, at 188-89.
12 Helpman, supra note 6, at 13.
13 Chantal Thomas, Law and Neoclassical Economic Development in Theoiy and Practice:
Toward an Institutionalist Critique of Institutionalism 96 CORNELL L. REv. 967 (2011).
14 See id. at 973-1001.
15 See id. at 1002-18.
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for the persistence of some of the implementation problems and sug-
gests some structural improvements.16
I will compare Thomas's account with the conventional one and
try to understand its implications. I will then briefly discuss parts II
and III and try to answer the question raised by the conference: What
is the future of legal theory? Thomas's essay suits this task well, as
evidenced by its title: Thomas treats law separately from economic de-
velopment and from institutions, thereby questioning the relationship
between legal and economic theories."7 Law itself ("the rule of law"),
of course, remains a major part of what Thomas refers to in her dis-
cussion of institutions.18
I
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
The Washington Consensus, articulated in 1990, was meant to
synthesize the reforms that most economists in the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the U.S. Treasury, and some of
Washington's think tanks believed were necessary for sustained eco-
nomic growth.' 9 It emphasized the importance of privatization, fiscal
discipline, trade and financial liberalization, and price stability, and it
is associated with "market fundamentalism"-the view that markets
solve economic problems by themselves and that government inter-
vention is destructive.20
16 See id. at 1018-23.
17 Development, international trade, economic growth, political economy, and eco-
nomic history are all separate fields of expertise in economics. They occasionally overlap,
and some scholars specialize in more than one of these fields, but in their scholarly work,
these scholars usually contribute to each field separately. For how the faculty in the Eco-
nomics Department at Harvard define their fields of expertise, see Faculty Directory,
HARvARD UNIV. DEP'T OF ECON., http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty (last visited
Mar. 8, 2011). Legal academics do not seem to make such distinctions, and legal scholars
writing in these fields seem to engage in all of the above and possibly more, often within
the same paper.
18 See Thomas, supra note 13, at 988-89.
19 THE WORLD BANK, ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE 1990s: LEARNING FROM A DECADE OF
REFORM xi (2005) [hereinafter EcoNOMic GROWTH IN THE 1990s]; see alsoJohn Williamson,
What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: How MUCH HAS
HAPPENED? 7, 7-20 (John Williamson ed., 1990) (discussing proposed reforms under the
Washington Consensus). John Williamson was the economist who coined the term "Wash-
ington Consensus" in a background paper prepared in 1989. SeeJohn Williamson, A Short
History of the Washington Consensus, in THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: To-
WARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 14, 14 (Narcis Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2008)
[hereinafter Williamson, A Short History of the Washington Consensus].
20 See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE ROARING NINETIES: A NEW HISTORY OF THE WORLD'S
MOST PROSPEROUS DECADE 229-30 (2003); Narcfs Serra et al., Introduction to THE WASHING-
TON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 19, at 3,
3.
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The experience of the last two decades has proved the Consensus
wrong. Countries that followed these suggestions most closely, such as
those in Latin America and in Sub-Saharan Africa, either crashed or
failed to take off. On the other hand, countries that violated most of
the tenets of the Washington Consensus, such as China and India,
have experienced unprecedented growth rates in the past two de-
cades. 2 1 A large body of scholarship in the first decade of the twenty-
first century has explored what went wrong and what can be learned
from the Washington Consensus.
According to the conventional account, the Washington Consen-
sus predated the theory that institutions were important for economic
development and ignored institutions in its policy blueprint.22 To put
it in Rodrik's words:
Most of the items in [John] Williamson's original list were relatively
simple policy changes (liberalize trade, eliminate currency overvalu-
ation, reduce fiscal deficits, and so on) that did not require deep-
seated institutional changes. Williamson did include "property
rights" in his list, but that was the last item on the list and came
almost as an afterthought.2 3
Moreover, accounting for the importance of institutions would
have been opposed to its market fundamentalism approach. The
Washington Consensus was a reaction to the development policies of
earlier decades that advocated for government intervention to correct
market failures. Slow growth in many developing countries in the
1980s, especially in Latin America, created a pendulum effect that
called for minimal government intervention. 24 According to Stiglitz
The Washington Consensus policies often assumed the worst about
the nature and capability of all governments,... arguing that it was
better simply to rely on markets by themselves. This resulted in a
strong bias against basing policy advice on an analysis of what inter-
21 See RODRIK, supra note 7, at 55 ("If Latin America were booming today and China
and India were stagnating, we would have an easier time fitting the world to our policy
framework."); see also International Macroeconomic Data Set, supra note 4 (showing growth
rates for countries in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as for China and
India).
22 See Dani Rodrik, Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review
of the World Bank's Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform, 44J.
EcoN. LIT. 973, 978 (2006).
23 Id.
24 See ECONOMic GROWTH IN THE 1990s, supra note 19 ("What for many countries had
been the 'lost decade' of the 1980s made it evident that government interference in the
economy-through price controls, foreign exchange rationing, distorted trade regimes,
repressed financial markets, and state ownership of commercial enterprises-wasted re-
sources and impeded growth. Hence, the logic went, rolling back the state would lead
developing countries to sustained growth.").
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ventions are appropriate in what contexts, or building the institu-
tions or capacity of states to intervene effectively.25
In part I of Law and Neoclassical Development in Theory and Practice,
Thomas provides a different account of that history.26 She perceives
the theory of institutions as going hand in hand with market funda-
mentalism.27 She argues that while chronologically "macro-
economics" was the first stage of the Washington Consensus and
"governance" was the second stage, on the theory level, they were
equal.2 8 According to her account, the neoclassical movement was
merely waiting for the politically appropriate moment to consolidate
its agenda. 29 In the appendix, she placess "Good Governance" (the
theory of institutions) and "Structural Adjustment" (market funda-
mentalism) together.30
Anne Krueger, whose name appears in parentheses under "Struc-
tural Adjustment" in Thomas's appendix, is a plausible link between
the two.3s Krueger was the World Bank's chief economist from 1982
to 1986.32 She was known for her academic work on rent seeking, and
according to Stiglitz, she "saw government as the problem."33 In 2004,
when the World Bank and the IMF were trying to learn from the fail-
ure of the Washington Consensus, Krueger gave a speech in which she
argued that the reason the Washington Consensus failed was not that
it was wrong but that it did not go far enough. She believed it should
have been supplemented with institutional reform. 34
What is especially original in Thomas's account of the history is
her argument that the only reason that the Washington Consensus
did not include institutional reforms was an obstacle in the form of a
question of legal interpretation.35 According to Thomas, advocating
institutional reforms would have been interpreted as violating a prohi-
bition in the World Bank's charter against interference in the "politi-
cal affairs" of borrower states.3 6 This obstacle was removed around
1990.37 According to Thomas, removing this obstacle was possible
25 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Is There a Post-Washington Consensus Consensus?, in THE WASHING-
TON CONSENSUs RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 19, at 41,
46.
26 See Thomas, supra note 13, at 937-1001.
27 See id. at 970, 973-91.
28 See id. at 970-71, 973-1001.
29 See id. at 970-71.
30 See id. Appendix.
31 See id.
32 Anne Osborn Krueger, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.ivkipedia.org/wiki/AnneOsbomKrue-
ger (last visited Mar. 8, 2011).
33 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 13 (2002).
34 See Rodrik, supra note 22, at 977.
35 See Thomas, supra note 13, at 970-71, 991-93.
36 See id.
37 See id.
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due to geopolitical changes, such as the end of the Cold War, that
strengthened the power of the United States and, in Thomas's words,
provided "political momentum [for] development agencies [to seek]
broad-based changes in the basic commitments of economic policy by
the beneficiary government, a position consistent with
neoclassicism."38
Thomas's account of the history contradicts the story told by Wil-
liamson, who coined the term "Washington Consensus."3 9 Williamson
argued that when he prepared the list of ten reforms that constituted
the Washington Consensus, he did not believe that the "'neoliberal'
innovations" of the Reagan Administration and Thatcher's govern-
ment had "survived the demise of the former," with the exception of
privatization. 40 This does not necessarily mean that Thomas is wrong.
Williamson may have been unaware of the politics that took place
above his head, and, moreover, that his superiors did not share his
view that neoliberalism had died.
What are the implications of Thomas's unconventional account
of the history of the institutional theory? Thomas argues that since
the late 1990s, development discourse has started to accommodate an-
other perspective, which is built on a strong belief in the private mar-
ket but sees an important role for the government. 41 However, "[a]s
of yet," according to Thomas, "the practical influence of these more
moderate approaches, and their theoretical distinctness from neoclas-
sicism, still appear debatable." 4 2
It seems that the reason Thomas is unsure about the practical
influence of the more moderate views is her disbelief in the conven-
tional narrative, which states that the World Bank made a mistake,
admitted it, and has been trying to learn from it and come up with
better development policies, including through a new focus on institu-
tions.43 According to Thomas's story, the Bank's new emphasis on
institutions is not the outcome of learning from past mistakes but the
implementation of more or less the same neoclassical ideology. 44
Thomas argues that the "learning process" by which practitioners real-
ized their desired reforms "were ineffective without appropriate insti-
tutions and laws" was "bounded by the theoretical constraints of
38 Id. at 992.
39 See supra note 19.
40 Williamson, A Short History of the Washington Consensus, supra note 19, at 15-16.
41 See Thomas, supra note 13, at 985-90.
42 Id. at 989.
43 See e.g., ECONOMIc GROWrH IN THE 1990s, supra note 19. Rodrik described this pub-
lication as "a genuinely interesting document: it represents a mea culpa as well as a way
forward." Rodrik, supra note 22, at 986.
44 See Thomas, supra note 13, at 970.
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neoclassicism." 45 Thomas suggests that portentous world events pro-
vided the opportunity for the neoclassical movement to expand its
influence; accordingly, Thomas sees Krueger's view as representing
the true ideology of the Bank and the theory of institutions as simply a
more rigorous implementation of neoclassical policy. 46
II
THE ENDOGENEITY PROBLEM
The theory that countries with better institutions will attract
greater investments in physical and human capital, spur innovation,
and use these factors more efficiently to achieve economic growth
than countries with worse institutions seems highly intuitive. Anecdo-
tal evidence, such as the divergent paths of North and South Korea
and East and West Germany, might also support this view. Neverthe-
less, it is theoretically possible that causality goes in the opposite direc-
tion, namely, that rich economies choose or can afford better
institutions or that good institutions and high per capita income are
correlated through other factors.4 7
Thomas argues that a close examination of the economic litera-
ture reveals that, in assuming that institutions are responsible for eco-
nomic growth, all authors rely on one seminal paper by Daron
Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson (AJR) that allegedly
found a source of exogenous variation in institutions that allowed test-
ing the theory that good institutions lead to high per capita income.4 8
AJR "propose [d] a theory of institutional differences among countries
colonized by Europeans."49 They found strong correlations among
(a) per capita income and existing institutions; (b) existing institu-
tions and institutions in 1900; and (c) mortality rates of soldiers, bish-
ops, and sailors stationed in the colonies between the seventeenth and
nineteenth centuries.5 0
AJR argued that the (potential) settler mortality rates were a ma-
jor determinant of settlements. 5' In places where the disease environ-
ment was favorable to European settlement, Europeans migrated and
settled, replicating European institutions with a strong emphasis on
private property and checks against government power.5 2 In places
where mortality rates were high, in contrast, Europeans did not settle
45 Id. (footnote omitted).
46 See id. at 971, 991-94.
47 See RODRIK, supra note 7, at 185-86.
48 See Thomas, supra note 13, at 1012-15.
49 See Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 Am. ECON. REV. 1369, 1370 (2001).
50 See id. at 1370-71, 1395.
51 See id. at 1373-74.
52 See id. at 1374.
1031
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
but set up "extractive states," which provided no protection for private
property, to facilitate the transfer of as much of the resources of the
colony as possible to the European colonizer.53
AJR viewed mortality rates as a possible source of exogenous vari-
ation proving that the causal direction was from institutions to high
per capita income.5 4 They found the relationship to be robust when
controlling for latitude, climate, current disease environment, relig-
ion, natural resources, soil quality, ethnolinguistic fragmentation, and
current racial composition.5 5
Thomas, however, makes an excellent point that many other fac-
tors could establish alternative causal relationships to the one that AJR
asserted.5 6 She notes, for example, that the amount of investment
capital and technology that the settlers brought with them could also
explain the variation.57 AJR's theory is intuitive, but it does not rule
out the possibility that institutional quality is endogenous to income
levels or that both are correlated through a third (unknown) factor.
III
IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTIES
Thomas argues that the rule of law is too vague a concept to pro-
vide any clear policy.58 She further argues that the use of the term
"property rights" is problematic because it is too simplistic.59 Thomas
then argues that the way the development literature currently dis-
cusses property rights reflects only one substantive neoclassical vision,
without acknowledging other views (with the exception of Amartya
Sen's) and without sufficiently acknowledging their susceptibility to
negative externalities.60
There are numerous critics of the one-size-fits-all approach.
Thomas cites articles, written by economists who worked with develop-
ment agencies in Latin America, that describe how this approach nev-
ertheless persists. 61 Moreover, programs that were supposed to
strengthen the rule of law inappropriately copied laws, lacked self-as-
sessment, and were therefore misguided or manipulated by interest
groups.
53 See id. at 1370, 1375.
54 See id. at 1395.
55 See id. at 1388-95.
56 See Thomas, supra note 13, at 1014.
57 See id.
58 See id. at 1003-05.
59 See id. at 1005.
60 See id. at 1005-07.
61 See id. at 1006-07, 1014-17.
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In part III, Thomas suggests a general explanation for the persis-
tence of these failures.6 2 She argues that the institutions of develop-
ment policy suffer from the same problems they are supposed to cure,
such as imperfect information, unequal bargaining power, and subjec-
tive models that would preclude individuals from perceiving institu-
tional inefficiencies. 63
Thomas, therefore, calls for an "institutionalist analysis of institu-
tionalism." 64 In particular, she suggests improving program design by
implementing mechanisms of evaluation and knowledge building by
the development agencies themselves, with greater emphasis on hir-
ing locals to do the research and the consulting work.65 Finally, she
acknowledges the inevitability that donor countries' national interests
would affect development policy, but she calls on the professional
corps to establish normative pressure as a counterweight.66
It is difficult to pin down what makes Thomas's essay "legal"
scholarship. The central theme of the paper, which is the intellectual
history of institutional theory, could have been written by an eco-
nomic historian.6 7 Her discussion of the vagueness of the rule of law
or the complexity of property rights did not require legal skills, but
maybe only a legal academic would feel confident enough to make
such arguments.6 8 Additionally, her discussion of the interpretation
of the prohibition in the World Bank's charter against interference in
the "political affairs" of borrower states is clearly a legal matter. 69
However, the essay only mentioned this; it did not pursue a legal anal-
ysis. 70 Parts II and III raise the causality argument and discuss policy
implementation issues; none of them is uniquely legal.7 1
I think that what makes the paper legal scholarship is its inher-
ently interdisciplinary character. Thomas does not limit herself to
one specific field of expertise. The topic of institutions cuts across
62 See id. at 1018-23.
63 See id. at 1019.
64 See id.
65 See id. at 1018-20.
66 See id.
67 Historians or political scientists specializing in economic history could also have
written the central theme of Thomas's essay. Specifically, Thomas mentions that the first
part of the paper was influenced by David Scott, an anthropologist. See Thomas, supra note
13, at 971 n.22. Clearly, an economist specializing in the field of development could also
discuss the change in development policies, but the type of analysis, or perhaps merely the
style of analysis, performed in the first part of her essay is different from development-
economics scholarship and would fit into the category of economic history. See id. at
973-1001.
68 See id. at 1002-07.
69 See id. at 970-71, 992-94.
70 See id.
71 See, e.g., RODRIK, sup-a note 7, at 184-92 (discussing these issues outside of a legal
context).
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many fields and requires the integration of various areas in the social
sciences. Nonlegal academics might be unable to provide a combina-
tion of a detailed big-picture analysis that addresses both theory and
practice, such as the one provided in Thomas's essay, unless they col-
laborated with colleagues from other fields. Legal academics, on the
other hand, would simply research whatever they thought was neces-
sary to get to the bottom of things, using common sense to compen-
sate for an occasional lack of specific expertise.
